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ABSTRACT
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity
presents a relatively new international legal framework.
Although the United States is not currently bound by this
legal instrument, its impact may be felt in the life sciences
innovation
sector
and
beyond.
Transnational
implementation mechanisms for the Nagoya Protocol have a
combination of property law and contract law as their
theoretical underpinning. Stakeholders who are entering
into an agreement with their foreign counterparts should
honor the Access and Benefit-Sharing scheme as well as
domestic laws and policies of Parties to the Protocol to
access biological materials located in their jurisdictions.
Users’ due diligence in obtaining prior informed consent
and adhering to mutually agreed terms will contribute
greatly to promoting the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol
and the Convention on Biological Diversity.
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INTRODUCTION
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization
(“Nagoya Protocol” or “Protocol”)1 to the Convention on Biological
Diversity (“CBD” or “Convention”) 2 presents a relatively new
international legal framework with respect to cross-border
transactions of biological resources. The Nagoya Protocol most
likely affects biotechnological, pharmaceutical, cosmetic,
agricultural, food, and other industries that obtain non-human
genetic materials from other countries for developing useful
1

The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, opened for signature Feb. 2, 2011, U.N.T.S. A-30619
(entered into force Oct. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol],
https://www.cbd.int/abs/text/.
2
Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992,
1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter CBD],
https://www.cbd.int/convention/text/.
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biological products and processes. Although the United States is
currently not a Party to the Convention,3 the treaty’s impact may be
felt broadly in the life sciences innovation sector and beyond.
This emerging global standard, in combination with the
domestic law of the member states, creates complexities with regard
to what steps a stakeholder must take to be legally compliant and
accountable for their conduct when working with genetic resources
and knowledge attributable to a particular geographic region or
indigenous community. The implementation mechanisms for this
international law in each jurisdiction essentially come down to
contracts over the exchange of property between providers and
users, reflecting individually negotiated and mutually agreed-upon
terms (“MAT”). Regardless of the United States’ status as a nonParty to the Nagoya Protocol, contractual obligations may be
imposed on whoever wants to use biological resources of foreign
origin under the Access and Benefit-Sharing (“ABS”) scheme. Such
contractual terms will likely incorporate by reference relevant
domestic laws of the resource provider. Users should defer to, rather
than resist, the extraterritorial application of the provider country’s
rules and policies.
I. NAGOYA PROTOCOL BACKGROUND
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization
to the Convention on Biological Diversity is an international
agreement governing cross-border transactions of genetic resources.
This legal instrument has been in effect since October 12, 2014.4 It
is one of the supplementary agreements to the Convention on
Biological Diversity,5 an umbrella treaty that has been universally
adopted by almost the entire world except the United States. Largely
3

As of 2018, the only other jurisdiction in the world that is not a Party to the
Convention is Holy See, a church jurisdiction in Rome, Italy. See CBD List of
Parties, https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml.
4
Nagoya Protocol, https://www.cbd.int/abs/.
5
The other supplementary agreement to the Convention is the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for
signature May 15, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 (entered into force Sept. 11, 2003),
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/.
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unbeknownst to Americans, the Nagoya Protocol may have
significant positive or negative impact on future global intellectual
property strategies, particularly in the life sciences innovation field
as discussed below.
A. Nagoya Protocol’s Objectives
The Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) is an
international legally binding treaty with three main goals: the (1)
conservation of biodiversity, (2) sustainable use of the components
of biodiversity, and (3) equitable sharing of the benefits derived
from the use of genetic resources. 6 The Nagoya Protocol, a
supplementary agreement to the CBD, is the legal instrument
developed specifically to implement the last of these three core
goals: providing access to and sharing the benefits arising from the
utilization of genetic resources in a fair and equitable manner.7 The
Nagoya Protocol is intended to accomplish this objective by
facilitating access to genetic resources, transferring relevant
technologies and knowledge, and by allocating appropriate funding.
By doing so, the Protocol strives to contribute to the other two
primary goals of the CBD: conservation of biological diversity and
the sustainable use of its components.8
B. Treaty Ratification Status
The CBD is one of the multilateral agreements hosted by the
United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”). The
Convention was opened for signature at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development—known as the Rio
Earth Summit—in 1992 and entered into force in December 1993.9
As of 2018, 196 countries—indeed, almost the entire world—have
ratified the CBD.
The Nagoya Protocol was adopted by the Conference of the
6

CBD art. 1.
Nagoya Protocol preamble; CBD art. 15.
8
Nagoya Protocol arts. 1, 9.
9
Nagoya Protocol intro, https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoyaprotocol-en.pdf.
7
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Parties of the Convention at its tenth meeting in October 2010 in
Nagoya, Japan. It was opened for signature in 2011-201210 and was
entered into force in October 2014 pursuant to Article 33.11 As of
April 2018, 105 countries—just over half of the 196 Parties to the
CBD—have domesticated the instrument to become Parties to the
Nagoya Protocol. 12 Once joined, member states may not make
reservations; they are fully bound by the provisions of the Nagoya
Protocol.13 The Secretariat to both the Convention and the Nagoya
Protocol is located in Montreal, Canada, 14 although ironically
Canada, a Party to the CBD, has yet to sign the Nagoya Protocol as
of this writing.
The United States remains a non-Party to both the Convention
and the Nagoya Protocol. The CBD is a non-self-executing treaty
under the United States’ laws, and thus by itself does not give rise
to a domestically enforceable law. Instead, the U.S. government
treats the CBD as an Article II treaty, for which the Constitution’s
Treaty Clause requires that two-thirds of the Senate give its advice
and consent, before the President may ratify the agreement. 15 In
June 1993, then-President Bill Clinton signed the Convention.
However, the treaty has never received an affirmative vote of the
Senate, partly due to its low priority status on the Congress’s
political agenda.16 Because the United States has yet to become a
10

Id. art. 32.
Id. art. 33 (providing that the protocol would enter into force on the 90th
day after the date of deposit of the 50th instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession by States . . . that are party to the Convention).
12
CBD, The Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House [hereinafter
ABSCH], https://absch.cbd.int/countries/status/party (last visited Mar. 1, 2018)
(counting the European Union as among the 105 Parties to the Nagoya Protocol).
13
Nagoya Protocol art. 34.
14
CBD art. 24; Nagoya Protocol art. 28; CBD SECRETARIAT,
https://www.cbd.int/secretariat/ (last accessed Mar. 1, 2018).
15
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
16
See Original Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding
Conditions for Continued United States Participation Under the Convention on
Biological Diversity. S. Res. 239, 103rd Cong., 140 CONG. REC. 15822 (as
reported by S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, July 11, 1994); see also Robert F.
Blomquist, Ratification Resisted: Understanding America’s Response to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1989-2002, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
493, 499 (2002) (providing a chronological synopsis of the U.S. government’s
11
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Party to the Convention, it is automatically ineligible to become a
Party to the Nagoya Protocol pursuant to the CBD provision.17
C. Nagoya Protocol’s Vocabulary
The Protocol’s use-of-terms and scope provisions are found in
Articles 2 and 3, respectively. They incorporate and are consistent
with the corresponding provisions of its parent treaty.18 In addition
to genetic resources themselves, the Nagoya Protocol applies to
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and to the
benefits arising from the utilization of such traditional knowledge
within the scope of the Convention.19
However, neither the scope provision nor the use-of-terms
provision is definitive enough to create a consensus among Parties
over the meaning of key terms, such as “genetic resources” and
“traditional knowledge,” which would facilitate communication
about these important concepts with stakeholders. The term “genetic
resources” seems intentionally excluded from the list of definitions
in the Protocol. This obvious gap is filled by the Convention, which
defines “genetic resources” merely as genetic material of actual or
potential value;20 and “genetic material” as any material of plant,
animal, microbial, or other origin containing functional units of
heredity.21
In fact, only five terms are defined under the Protocol Article
22
2. One such term is “utilization of genetic resources,” which
Article 2 defines as the act of conducting research and development
on the genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic resources,
including through the application of biotechnology. 23
“Biotechnology” is defined as any technological application that
uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to
response to the Convention).
17
CBD art. 32(1).
18
Nagoya Protocol arts. 2–3; CBD arts. 2, 4.
19
Nagoya Protocol arts. 3, 12.
20
CBD art. 2, para. 11.
21
Id. art. 2, para. 9 (emphasis added).
22
The remaining two terms listed under Article 2 are “Conference of the
Parties” and “Convention.” Nagoya Protocol art. 2(a) & 2(b).
23
Id. art. 2(c).
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make or modify products or processes for specific use. 24
“Derivative” is further defined as “a naturally occurring biochemical
compound resulting from the genetic expression or metabolism of
biological or genetic resources, even if it does not contain functional
units of heredity.”25 Accordingly, the subject matter of the Nagoya
Protocol should be construed much more broadly than just DNA
itself.
The only explicit threshold to the otherwise highly inclusive
concept of “genetic resources” is that human genetic resources are
excluded from the framework of the Protocol. 26 Still, traditional
knowledge associated with genetic resources of non-human origin
is possessed by particular indigenous peoples or individuals, and
therefore the Protocol still has legal and ethical implications
specifically relating to human subjects research. 27 In the treaty’s
attempt to grasp the constantly evolving nature of life sciences and
biotechnology fields, omitting a definition of “genetic resources”
likely reflects the drafters’ intention to allow the scope of “genetic
resources” to broaden in the future. This would allow the term to
cover novel types of materials as they became available with
advancements in technology and applications to a wider array of
biological resources. For example, over the last several years, the
Conferences of the Parties have considered whether to enlarge the
scope of the Protocol to encompass such items as digital genetic
24

Id. art. 2(d).
Id. art. 2(e) (emphasis added).
26
CBD, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the CBD
[COP] at its 10th Meeting X/1, Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization, at 3, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (Oct. 29, 2010) (reserving the right to place human
genetic resources within the scope of the Protocol by stating “without prejudice
to the further consideration of this issue by the [COP]”).
27
Cf. In the United States, the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human
Subjects or “Common Rule” is federal regulations governing the protection of
human subjects in research. 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (1999); 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46); see also OFF. FOR HUMAN RESEARCH
PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INTERNATIONAL COMPILATION
OF
HUMAN
RESEARCH
STANDARDS,
2018
EDITION
(2018),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/2018-International-Compilation-ofHuman-Research-Standards.pdf (enumerating over 1,000 standards that govern
human subjects research in 130 countries).
25
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sequence information or microorganisms manipulated by synthetic
biological techniques. 28 Although the underlying context is
different, difficulty in delineating the scope and range of
biotechnology subject matter is somewhat analogous to patent
subject matter eligibility jurisprudence surrounding nucleic acids,
proteins, and other biochemical compounds, which has
independently developed under the patent laws of the U.S.,
European Union, and other jurisdictions.29
Other legal terms of art that are not separately defined in the
treaty provisions but are frequently used throughout the text of the
Protocol include prior informed consent (“PIC”) and mutually
agreed terms (“MAT”), in addition to Access and Benefit-Sharing
(“ABS”) and its equivalent phrases. The following sections provide
more context to these key terms as they are normally understood in
the Nagoya Protocol’s ABS framework.
D. Nagoya Protocol’s Conceptual Framework
The Nagoya Protocol asserts that the first two of the three pillars
of the CBD are promoted through fulfilling its third and final goal—
fair and equitable sharing of the economic value of ecosystems and
biodiversity, which encompasses benefits derived from the use of
28

CBD, Decision Adopted by the COP XIII/16, Digital Sequence
Information on Genetic Resources, at 1–2, U.N. Doc. CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/16
(Dec. 16, 2016) (establishing an ad hoc technical expert group to examine any
potential implications of the use of digital sequence information on genetic
resources for the objectives of the Convention and the Protocol); Digital Sequence
Information on Genetic Resources Public Meeting, 82 Fed. Reg. 28927 (June 26,
2017) (calling for public comments in consideration for U.S. participation in
future CBD and Nagoya Protocol meetings); see also Margo A. Bagley, Digital
DNA: The Nagoya Protocol, Intellectual Property Treaties, and Synthetic
Biology, WILSON CENTER: SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY PROJECT (Dec. 2015),
http://www.synbioproject.org/publications/digital-dna-nagoya-protocol/.
29
See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (ruling that isolated DNA is not within the scope of patent
eligible subject matter under the U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101); see also
Convention on the Grant of European Patents [European Patent Convention
(EPC)] art. 52 & EPC Implementing Regulations r. 27(a) (allowing biological
material isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical
process as a patentable biotechnological invention).

2018]

ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING

117

genetic resources.30
Economics play a role here in understanding the Nagoya
Protocol’s underlying principle. The Protocol introduces an
economic perspective to transnational genetic resources
management by first recognizing public awareness of the economic
value of ecosystems and biodiversity.31 It further recognizes that the
fair and equitable sharing of this economic value with the custodians
of biodiversity is a key incentive for the conservation of biological
diversity and the sustainable use of its components. 32 Under the
CBD, custodians of biodiversity include sovereign states as well as
indigenous and local communities.
As far as the semantic relationship between the “ecosystem and
biodiversity” and “genetic resources” is concerned, the former
describes certain variable modes of the natural environment and its
elements, 33 while the latter—despite the term not having been
explicitly defined in the Protocol itself—ordinarily refers to tangible
materials existing as integral components of a certain biological
system with intrinsic value recognized at the molecular level.34 Of
course, if digital DNA sequence data falls within the scope of
“genetic resources,”35 then the term would cover not only tangible
property, but also intangible information.
On one hand, an ecosystem may exhibit inherent economic value
30

CBD art. 1; Nagoya Protocol preamble (emphasis added).
Nagoya Protocol preamble.
32
Id. (emphasis added).
33
CBD art. 2, paras. 1 & 8 (defining ecosystem as “a dynamic complex of
plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living environment
interacting as a functional unit,” whereas defining biological diversity as “the
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia,
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of
which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of
ecosystems”).
34
See supra text accompanying notes 20–21; see also, e.g., Morten Walløe
Tvedt & Peter Johan Schei, The Term ‘Genetic Resources’: Flexible and Dynamic
While Providing Legal Certainty?, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC
RESOURCES: ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING AFTER THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL 18
(Sebastian Oberthür & G. Kristin Rosendal eds., 2014) (illustrating rather
inconsistent meanings of the term “genetic resources” as adopted by international
organizations).
35
See Bagley, supra note 28.
31
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in the biosphere and provide measurable benefits to human beings.
This concept is recognized today in the ecosystem services and
natural capital contexts.36 On the other hand, scientific inquiries and
sophisticated technology can enhance the economic value of genetic
resources as property by deciphering genetic codes and their
functions in the living system. It is unlikely that genetic resources as
they exist in nature become automatically more valuable in
economic terms by virtue of being harvested. In this regard, genetic
resources are different from other kinds of natural resources, such
as oil and gas. But there are similarities, too. For example, both are
commonly viewed as non-ubiquitous, finite resources that should
not be overexploited. Indeed, one could even argue that the
traditional rule of capture or the labor theory of property would
apply to genetic resources in determining property ownership, since
those concepts apply to other migratory resources like oil and gas.37
To attain the primary objective of the Nagoya Protocol and
ultimately reach the overarching goals of the umbrella biodiversity
treaty, baseline research and development activities utilizing genetic
resources must increase. An increase would provide for the creation
of new intellectual property and commodities, promote technology
transfer and commercialization in industries, and establish crossborder revenue streams in a fair and equitable manner under the
Protocol’s grand scheme.
But an increase would come with costs, as it requires both
money and manpower to actively protect and conserve biodiversity
in balance with other competing economic interests. Further, it is
prohibitively more expensive to try to restore habitats once
destroyed or lost. Therefore, to promote a sound and balanced
economy, the Protocol urges prospectors of genetic resources to
either pay the cost up front or to return a part of the profits, assets,
and knowledge generated to source countries or communities in
exchange for benefits arising from such genetic resources. The term
Access and Benefit-Sharing (“ABS”) captures this concept.
36

See Sharachchandra Lele, et al., Ecosystem Services: Origins,
Contributions, Pitfalls, and Alternatives, 11 CONSERVATION & SOC. 343, 343–45
(2013).
37
See Jessica L. Roberts, Theories of Genetic Ownership, 38, 46 (Sept. 9,
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Petrie-Flom Center, Harvard
Law School).
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However, uncertainty remains as to whether new international rules
governing the use of natural resources have sufficient legal force to
mandate resource providers—who are mostly developing countries
and indigenous communities—to return benefits to society by fully
committing to sustainable development and local capacity building.
For example, it is unclear whether resource providers are required
to allocate a set amount of funding for regional habitat restoration
efforts or for biotechnology specialists training.38
E. Challenges Posed by the Protocol
As reaffirmed in its preamble, the Nagoya Protocol is grounded
in the fundamental idea that each country should exercise its
sovereign rights over its natural resources.39 This is a fundamental
departure from the traditional view that biological resources on
Earth are in the public domain and in should be freely available as
global common goods. Yet in the property paradigm, countries
enforcing their sovereign rights too strictly over biotic resources—
including forms of living organisms such as human pathogens and
microorganisms found within its national territory—generate
concerns that the Protocol’s scheme will eventually languish under
the tragedy of the anticommons. The tragedy of the anticommons
describes a legal environment where multiple owners are each
endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource,
with no one person possessing an effective privilege of use.40 When
there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource
is prone to underuse. 41 On the contrary, lack of international
coordination on the use of finite natural resources on the planet may
38

Nagoya Protocol art. 22 (focusing capacity-building efforts on the least
developed countries, small island developing states, and indigenous and local
communities); id. art. 22, para. 5(h) (listing enhanced contribution of ABS
activities to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity as a capacity
development measure); see also infra note 53. But see id. art. 9 (merely
encouraging, but not requiring, directing benefits towards the biodiversity
conservation).
39
Nagoya Protocol preamble.
40
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623 (1998).
41
Id. at 624.
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lead to the tragedy of the commons, where the resources are prone
to overuse. 42 An example of this is found in marine biodiversity
beyond national jurisdictions, where each country attempts to claim
rights over resources on the high seas beyond any country’s
exclusive economic zone.43
In addition to concerns over resource underutilization, apparent
regulatory complexities set by the Protocol can stifle innovations
and sound competition in a manner contrary to the Protocol’s
purposes of encouraging active use of genetic resources in the global
bioeconomy. This means that unless it is properly administered, the
treaty may have a chilling effect on bona fide international
bioprospecting activities, and may even create a hostile environment
for noncommercial biodiversity researchers.44
Furthermore, depending on the degree of flexibility in enforcing
the treaty provisions to realize fair and equitable transactions of
genetic resources, the Protocol may have substantial implications on
global health agenda, such as distribution of drugs, vaccines and
antibiotics to developing countries. For example, in pre-Nagoya
2007, Indonesia refused to share its clinical specimens of H5N1
avian flu virus to the World Health Organization (“WHO”) in
retaliation for the inequitable virus sharing practice in the global
health sector that existed at the time. 45 The Indonesian avian flu
strain was supposed to be used for vaccine production by a private
entity in Australia that planned to use this free virus sample to patent
42

Id.
See Development of an International Legally Binding Instrument Under
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 69/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/69/292 (June 19, 2015).
44
See, e.g., Jörg Overmann & Amber Hartman Scholz, Microbiological
Research Under the Nagoya Protocol: Facts and Fiction, 25 TRENDS IN
MICROBIOLOGY 85 (2017) (arguing that non-commercial basic research will be
negatively affected by restrictive policies under the Protocol).
45
Endang R. Sedyaningsih et al., Towards Mutual Trust, Transparency and
Equity in Virus Sharing Mechanism: The Avian Influenza Case of Indonesia, 37
ANNALS ACAD. MED. SINGAPORE 482, 486 (2008); see also Marie Wilke, A
Healthy Look at the Nagoya Protocol: Implications for Global Health
Governance, THE 2010 NAGOYA PROTOCOL ON ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING
IN PERSPECTIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IMPLEMENTATION
CHALLENGE, at 123–24 (2013).
43
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a vaccine, and sell the product back to Indonesia at an unaffordable
price. 46 This illustrates the frequent tension between stakeholders
with competing interests over valuable biological property. As here,
these are interests in securing access to human pathogens for public
health purposes, protecting intellectual property for profits, and
preventing valuable resources from being exploited by foreigners.
The avian flu vaccine served as a great lesson for WHO, as WHO
and CBD now work together closely to strengthen linkages between
biodiversity and human health—particularly in the context of
sharing pathogens and relevant clinical information during public
health emergencies.47
A pragmatic solution to overcome these various challenges
would be to keep implementation mechanisms for the Nagoya
Protocol simple, transparent, and flexible. A balance must be struck
under this paradigm so that legitimate rights holders are adequately
protected from unfair dealings, while for-profit bio-prospectors are
still deterred from unjust enrichment. As analyzed in the later
section on the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House, the
high-level monitoring of ABS activities would probably be the best
way for the Protocol to strike this balance. At the same time, the
Protocol should allow provider-user negotiation at the ground level
to maximize the Parties’ freedom of contract. Using the instrument’s
terminology, as long as prior informed consent (“PIC”) can be
secured, 48 mutually agreed terms (“MAT”) 49 between parties in
private contracts are best left to negotiation to the extent permitted
by the provider’s domestic laws. This approach will maximize the
46

Sedyaningsih et al., supra note 45, at 486.
World Health Organization [WHO], Review of the Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework: Collaboration with the Secretariat of the CBD and
Other Relevant International Organizations, at 2, WHO Doc. A70/57 (May 4,
2017) (recommending that the WHO flu preparedness framework be recognized
as a specialized international ABS instrument under the Protocol and that CBD
share with WHO information regarding the ABS implementation on health
emergency cases through a national reporting system under Nagoya Protocol arts.
4(4) & 8(b) & 29); see also Daniel Cressey, Treaty to Stop Biopiracy Threatens
to Delay Flu Vaccines, 542 NATURE 148 (2017) (highlighting WHO’s direction
to integrate a benefit-sharing mechanism into the global vaccine supply system to
expedite seasonal flu vaccine production).
48
Nagoya Protocol art. 6.
49
Id. art. 5.
47
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positive effects of freedom of contract while promoting access to
untapped genetic resources found within the territory of each
provider country.
F. Nagoya Protocol and Intellectual Property
Although the subject matter of the Nagoya Protocol is primarily
biological, its reach is not limited to environmental and natural
resources laws as implied by the parent treaty’s title, Convention on
Biological Diversity, implies. As demonstrated by the example of
the Indonesian avian flu virus, the Protocol frequently implicates
law regarding technology and intellectual property. Technology
transfer is an important part of the Protocol’s objective, as the
Protocol purports to contribute to sustainable development by
building research and innovation capacities in developing
economies, and adding value to genetic resources.50 Each Party to
the Protocol is required to take necessary legislative, administrative
or policy measures as appropriate to establish clear rules and
procedures for mandating and establishing MAT, including benefitsharing clauses that address relevant intellectual property rights.51
This means that under the Nagoya framework, intellectual property
rights are presumed to be among a “bundle of rights” to be
considered up front in bilateral negotiations between providers and
users of genetic resources, and memorialized in a written contract
called a material transfer agreement.
Developing MAT over intellectual property rights, or other
forms of benefits expected from the use of genetic resources, is
similar to drafting a standard technology licensing agreement. This
is especially true if benefit-sharing can be unambiguously written in
financial terms, such as royalties. 52 However, MAT established
under Nagoya are still distinguishable from terms of a technology
license in some critical respects. First, although individually
negotiated and agreed-upon terms are flexible to a certain extent,
they must conform with the domestic laws of the provider country
implementing the treaty. The Protocol is designed so that specific
measures to implement its ABS scheme are largely left to the
50

Id. preamble.
Id. art. 6.3(g)(ii).
52
Id. annex 1(d).
51
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prerogative of each Party. Unless the provider country explicitly
disclaims its rights to genetic resources leaving its jurisdiction as a
matter of public policy, the provider country’s laws may have an
extraterritorial reach over all contracting parties, and may even
override a contradictory MAT. This could interfere severely with
the Parties’ freedom of contract.
Another idiosyncratic aspect of an ABS material transfer
agreement is that intellectual property may not have been fully
developed, or vested, at the time the Parties entered into an
executory agreement. Original source organisms or isolated
biochemical compounds themselves are merely raw materials of
limited commercial value. They are tangible and exhaustible
personal property. But intellectual property assets, once successfully
developed out of such exhaustible resources of intrinsic value,
become significantly more economically valuable. Moreover,
intellectual property is inexhaustible and can be shared with others
without diminishing its value. Quid pro quo in this context dictates
granting relevant intellectual property rights or other forms of
economic benefits to the source country in return for gaining access
to its original raw ingredients. Regarding benefits, the Protocol
assumes a broad range of beneficial arrangements as acceptable
forms of benefits that can be exchanged under the ABS scheme. For
reference, a non-exhaustive list of different types of benefits, both
monetary and non-monetary, is found in the Annex to the Protocol.53
Compared to standard technology licensing, parties may have to
allow material transfer agreements to contain indefinite language
where intellectual property has yet to be developed. This requires
parties to initially assume higher risk under the ABS framework,
even though they may be able to reassess, and modify original terms
after they execute an original agreement. From the industries’
perspectives, it may take years for companies to develop patentable
products such as pharmaceuticals. In such circumstances, the party
requesting access would likely favor a risk-averse approach, such as
53

Id. annex (listing plausible types of non-monetary benefits, inter alia,
sharing of results and collaboration in research programs; participation in product
development; admittance to ex situ facilities and databases; education and
training; transfer of knowledge and technology; capacity-building; food and
livelihood security benefits; social recognition; and joint ownership of intellectual
property rights).
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first conducting preliminary testing, and evaluating target materials
before expanding the project to a full industrial scale to lower the
risk of breaching any MATs.
In recent decades, traditional knowledge is a type of communityowned intellectual property right recognized not only by the CBD
and Nagoya Protocol, but also by the international intellectual
property sector. 54 As discussed earlier, the term “traditional
knowledge” is not defined within the Protocol or the Convention.
However, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)
defines traditional knowledge as a living body of knowledge passed
on from generation to generation within a community that often
forms part of a people’s cultural and spiritual identity.55 The CBD
Working Group has intensively reviewed the term and concept of
traditional knowledge since the 2000s. 56 Referred to as Article
8(j),57 the current proposed definition of traditional knowledge is:
the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 58 It is
generally understood that traditional knowledge has greatly
contributed to the discovery, creation, and preservation of valuable
community knowledge related to medicinal, therapeutic, and other
beneficial use of certain biological resources. However, dealing with
traditional knowledge in the context of a material transfer and
technology licensing agreement poses novel challenges for most
stakeholders.
See generally U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, STATE OF THE
WORLD’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, at 74, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/328, U.N. Sales No.
09.VI.13 (2009) (reviewing the history of indigenous peoples in light of
intellectual property rights, with emphasis on how the international property rights
regime has failed to recognize indigenous customary law).
55
World Intell. Prop. Org. [hereinafter WIPO], Traditional Knowledge,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
56
CBD Executive Secretary, Glossary of Relevant Key Terms and Concepts
Within the Context of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, U.N. Doc.
CBD/WG8J/10/3 (Sept. 10, 2017).
57
CBD art. 8(j) (“[P]romote . . . wider application [of traditional knowledge]
with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge . . . and
encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such
knowledge.”).
58
CBD Executive Secretary, supra note 56, annex.
54
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Because added value of genetic resources partly comes from its
essential attribution to a particular species or variety that originated
in a specific locality, geographical indication is presumed to be
another type of an intellectual property right to be accounted for in
benefit-sharing negotiation, despite absence of the term in the
Protocol text. Basically, provider countries would like to protect and
control geographical indications over new innovative products that
are developed in exchange for genetic resources uniquely sourced
from their respective territories. The geographical origin of products
has likewise been contemplated in the international trade context. In
particular, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) has a whole section
dedicated to geographical indications, with special reference to
wines and spirits. 59 “Geographical indications” are defined as
indications that identify a good as originating in the territory of a
member state, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given
quality, reputation, or other characteristic of the good is essentially
attributable to its geographical origin.60
Finally, as far as patent law is concerned, a great deal of
unknowns exist in current national policies among the member
states as to whether, when a claimed invention is based upon genetic
materials sourced from another jurisdiction bound by the Protocol,
domestic patent law requires applicants to comply with the Nagoya
Protocol as a prerequisite for granting a biotechnology patent. For
instance, domestic legislation could create new obligations for a
patent applicant to submit an official permit or certificate of
compliance to the national patent office. 61 Or the national patent
59

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights § 3,
arts. 22–24, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 308 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
60
TRIPS Agreement, supra, art. 22, ¶ 1.
61
See Draft Decision to Enhance Mutual Supportiveness Between the TRIPS
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, Communication from
Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, Thailand, the ACP
Group, and the African Group, at 2, WTO Doc. TN/C/W/59 (Apr. 19, 2011)
(proposing an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement by inserting Article 29bis,
which requires that patent applicants provide a copy of an Internationally
Recognized Certificate of Compliance with the Nagoya Protocol, infra text
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office could require applicants to disclose the country of origin of
foreign genetic materials that led to a claimed invention in a patent
publication. 62 Such mandatory disclosure in published patent
applications would put countries and communities on notice, and
may allow them to challenge patentability in a timely manner.63 Of
course, these public parties must show standing as holders of
property rights or traditional knowledge in interest, as well as a valid
claim under the applicable law of any given jurisdiction. Relatedly,
a domestic law, either by statute or case law, may enable the court
to invalidate a patent or render it unenforceable if the alleged
infringer can show that the patent-in-suit was derived from genetic
resources that were unlawfully acquired in noncompliance with a
provider country’s laws implementing the Protocol.64
accompanying notes 87–90) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement Article 29bis].
62
See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuan Li Fa (中华人民共和国
专利法) [Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, last rev’d Dec. 27, 2008,
effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 5, para. 2 (“Patent rights shall not be granted for
inventions that are accomplished by relying on genetic resources which are
obtained or used in violation of the provisions of laws and administrative
regulations.”); id. art. 26, para. 5 (“With regard to an invention-creation
accomplished by relying on genetic resources, the applicant shall, in the patent
application documents, indicate the direct and original source of the genetic
resources. If the applicant cannot indicate the original source, he shall state the
reasons.”),
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/lawsregulations/201101/t20110119_566244.html
; but see, e.g., Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, recital 27,
1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 15 (EC) (“[I]f an invention is based on biological material
of plant or animal origin or if it uses such material, the patent application should,
where appropriate, include information on the geographical origin of such
material, if known; whereas this is without prejudice to the processing of patent
applications or the validity of rights arising from granted patents”); see generally
WIPO,
DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
TABLE
(Oct.
2017),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/genetic_resources_d
isclosure.pdf (providing a non-exhaustive list of disclosure requirements related
to genetic resources or traditional knowledge in thirty-three jurisdictions).
63
See Wallace Feng, Appropriation Without Benefit-Sharing: Origin-ofResource Disclosure Requirements and Enforcement Under TRIPS and the
Nagoya Protocol, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 245, 249 (2017).
64
See TRIPS Agreement Article 29bis, supra note 61, at 3 (providing under
Article 29bis, paragraph 5, that if relevant national legislation of a provider
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II. ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE
The Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House is a public
website administered by the CBD Secretariat. 65 It is designed to
serve as a one-stop shop for obtaining comprehensive information
about the ABS-related activities, such as a list of countries bound by
the Nagoya Protocol, each country’s point of contact, the status of
national legislation, and policy documents.66 It also provides web
links to general administrative information released by the
Secretariat, such as minutes and decisions of Conferences of the
Parties. 67 Not only government officials, but also innovation
business owners, corporate counsel, scientists, technology transfer
practitioners at universities, and non-governmental organizations,
should be cognizant of what is available on the ABS Clearing-House
by visiting the site as often as necessary to obtain the latest
information. The site should be particularly useful for keeping those
working on projects involving bioscience or biotechnology
informed about how this evolving regime may directly affect their
activities. The following sections provide important points for these
individuals to contemplate before further exploring ABS
opportunities, as well as general guidance on where to locate
relevant information within the ABS Clearing-House.
A. Two Perspectives of a Party
When reviewing the Nagoya Protocol’s Access and BenefitSharing framework through the ABS Clearing-House, it is important
to consider that being a Party to the Protocol as a sovereign state
country is violated, the country may impose sanctions, including revocation of the
patent). In the United States, even if misappropriation of genetic resources
constitutes a violation of a foreign national law, it is unlikely to give rise to
unenforceability of a U.S. patent for inequitable conduct without a finding of butfor materiality of withheld information to patentability; see Therasense, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
65
Nagoya Protocol art. 14.
66
ABSCH, supra note 12, https://absch.cbd.int/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
67
ABSCH, CBD Secretariat [hereinafter SCBD] Records, Meetings,
https://absch.cbd.int/search/scbdRecords?schema=meeting (last visited Mar. 1,
2018).
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means being bound by two sets of reciprocal rules in multilateral
transactions of genetic resources: rights and obligations of a
provider, and rights and obligations of a user. To illustrate this,
Figure 1 exhibits a simplified interrelationship between Parties
under the Nagoya Protocol framework. This article discusses the
Access and Benefit-Sharing principle primarily with United States
users in mind. However, it is important to keep providers’ interests
in mind to achieve one’s intended business objectives without
risking encroaching on others’ interests.
At the national level, each Party is responsible for implementing
its commitment to the treaty through domestic legislation,
regulations, and administrative and policy measures. 68 Subject to
these domestic laws, a Party exercises state sovereignty over genetic
resources as both a provider country and user country with
associated rights and obligations. The Party’s designated authority,
called Competent National Authority, reviews individual access
requests containing provisions in the MAT. 69 The authority may
encourage benefit-sharing terms so that upon alienation of genetic
resources, the Party may retain a right to claim a share in benefits
from foreign users. 70 Within the exercise of sovereign rights, the
Competent National Authority makes a final determination whether
to deny or approve such an access request, and issues a permit or
equivalent written evidence certifying that the access requirements
have been met.71 Through these administrative processes, the Party
formally grants PIC for taking genetic resources for use overseas. In
theory, without such government-issued permits, biological
materials are not allowed to be exported from a source country.
On the receiving end, as soon as genetic materials of foreign
origin are brought into its jurisdiction by users’ request, the Party is
obligated to coordinate with the Secretariat to monitor the domestic
68

Nagoya Protocol art. 5 (benefit sharing); art. 6, para. 3 (access); arts. 15–
16 (compliance).
69
Id. art. 13.
70
See id. art. 13, para. 2 (“Competent national authorities shall . . . be
responsible for advising on applicable . . . requirements for obtaining [PIC] and
entering into [MAT].”).
71
Id. (“Competent national authorities shall . . . be responsible for granting
access or, as applicable, issuing written evidence that access requirements have
been met”).
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activities of the people and entities participating in the system as
individual resource users.72 The monitoring is done by designated
in-country Checkpoints to enhance transparency regarding the use
of genetic resources after permits are granted.73 The Party also has
a duty to report these ABS-related events through the ClearingHouse.74 Unsurprisingly, any given Party may be involved in the
treaty predominantly as a resource user, a resource provider, or both.
Presumably, countries and indigenous communities embracing
biodiversity hotspots,75 areas particularly rich in endemic plant and
animal species, tend to have greater economic interests at stake as a
provider than a user.
In accordance with domestic legislation, negotiation over MAT
may happen directly between the individual user, and the provider
country represented by the Competent National Authority or
National Focal Points in some cases.76 However, depending on the
individual circumstances, the MAT and PIC negotiation process
may also involve private rights owners. Rights owners in this
context include private property owners that grant direct access to
genetic resources as they are requested. In addition, indigenous or
local community representatives holding traditional knowledge
associated with genetic resources may also be involved. To
complicate the whole picture further, another category of parties in
interest may be actively involved in this legal ecosystem as well.
Examples are ex situ biorepositories, such as non-human gene banks
and culture collections, where organisms of different geographic
origins are stored in centralized facilities abroad. Stockpiled genetic
resources like these are generally publicly available to legitimate
72

Nagoya Protocol arts. 17, 29; see also id. art. 15, para. 2 & art. 16, para. 2
(requiring that each user country take appropriate, effective, and proportionate
measures to address situations of non-compliance with adopted measures).
73
Id. art. 17, para. 1.
74
See id. art. 14, para. 2 & art. 17, para. 1(a)(iii) (providing that sharing
information on ABSCH is without prejudice to the protection of confidential
information).
75
Cf. Russell A. Mittermeier et al., Global Biodiversity Conservation: The
Critical Role of Hotspots, BIODIVERSITY HOTSPOTS 3 (2011).
76
Id. art. 13; id. preamble (“[R]ecognizing the importance of promoting
equity and fairness in negotiation of [MAT] between providers and users of
genetic resources.”).
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researchers upon access request, such as the National Museum of
Natural History in the Smithsonian Institution. 77 Indeed,
noncommercial researchers worldwide have heavily relied on these
authentic third-party biological collections, even though existing
biorepositories would not completely substitute scientists’ need for
acquiring specimens of particular groups of organisms from in situ
sources, such as their native habitats.78 These additional players are
not represented in Figure 1, but the situation would likely create a
legal relationship similar to a trusteeship, guardianship,
custodianship, or stewardship.79
B. Information Available at the Clearing-House
The Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House’s web
interface has gone through extensive overhaul and redesigning to
improve user-friendliness. 80 Publicly available data stored in the
database has grown rapidly in recent years.81 Most of the records
See OFF. OF DIR., NAT’L MUSEUM OF NAT. HISTORY, SMITHSONIAN INST.,
ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING POLICY ON GENETIC RESOURCES (effective June
23, 2012) (expressing the full institutional commitment to the CBD and related
international instruments, including requesting PIC and MAT before the
collection or transport of genetic resources.).
78
See Myrna E. Watanabe, The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit
Sharing: International Treaty Poses Challenges for Biological Collections, 65
BIOSCIENCE 543 (2015) (highlighting perspectives of noncommercial researchers
concerning how the Nagoya Protocol may affect their collection-based work.);
see also D. Neumann et al., Global Biodiversity Research Tied Up by Juridical
Interpretations of Access and Benefit Sharing, ORGANISMS DIVERSITY &
EVOLUTION 1, 4 (Nov. 27, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/s13127-017-0347-1
(asserting that simplified measures should be created specifically for
noncommercial research as provided under the Protocol’s article 8(a).).
79
Peter H. Sand, Sovereignty Bounded: Public Trusteeship for Common Pool
Resources?, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL’YS 47, 52 (2004). An alternative
interpretation applicable to new acquisitions of genetic resources is that a
jurisdiction in which a public biorepository resides becomes a provider country
on a parity with the country of origin of such resources, as long as that repository
country has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Protocol and
the CBD. See Nagoya Protocol art. 5, para. 1; art. 6, para 1.
80
ABSCH, supra note 12.
81
As of the ABSCH’s official launch date Oct. 12, 2014, the database under
ABS Measures was populated with 26 national records from three jurisdictions;
77
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posted are available with direct web links or for free download in
.pdf format. The search engine allows site users to run a query based
on specific key words, or to narrow data to a specific country.
However, navigating through the Clearing-House is still far from
intuitive for first-time users, and takes practice to efficiently locate
and retrieve required information. Information at the ABS ClearingHouse is organized into three main categories: (1) national records,
(2) reference records, and (3) records managed by the Secretariat.82
1. National Records
National records are published by participating governments and
include national information relevant to the implementation of the
Nagoya Protocol, as well as information Parties are obliged to
provide in accordance with the Protocol. Types of records indexed
under this section include: ABS National Focal Points; Competent
National Authorities; ABS Measures; National Websites and
Databases; Internationally Recognized Certificates of Compliance;
Checkpoints; Checkpoint Communiqués; and Interim National
Reports.83
Because non-Parties are encouraged to contribute appropriate
information to the ABS Clearing-House, even the United States has
an entry in the database with its minimum country profile. 84
Furthermore, though as many as ninety-four countries are currently
listed as non-Parties to the Protocol, that does not necessarily mean
that those countries lack relevant domestic legislation. For instance,
Brazil is not yet a Party, but it has recently enacted a federal law
providing for its own ABS framework that has a similar effect when
combined with a user registration system.85 By filtering and sorting
by the end of 2015, 31 records from five jurisdictions; by the end of 2016, 153
records from 45 jurisdictions; and by the end of 2017, 284 records from 63
jurisdictions.
ABSCH,
ABS
Measures,
https://absch.cbd.int/search/nationalRecords?schema=measure (last visited Mar.
1, 2018).
82
ABSCH, supra note 12.
83
ABSCH, National Records, https://absch.cbd.int (last visited Mar. 1,
2018).
84
Nagoya Protocol art. 24.
85
Lei No. 13.123, de 20 de Maio de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
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the database, the ABS Clearing-House provides an entry point for
obscure information pertaining to Brazil and other non-Parties.86
It is noteworthy that the Secretariat is the only authority to issue
an Internationally Recognized Certificate of Compliance based on a
national permit granted and other related information submitted by
the Competent National Authority of a provider country concerning
an individual access request.87 Certificates of Compliance serve as
evidence of the authority’s decision to grant PIC and of the
establishment of MAT.88 Certificates of Compliance are published
on the ABS Clearing-House under the National Records section.89
These Certificates may disclose additional detail about PIC and
MAT as well as specific subject matter covered, whether
commercial use is allowed by the permit, and conditions for thirdparty transfer of genetic resources and associated intellectual
property rights.90 Although analysis of individual ABS projects is
beyond the scope of this article, information disclosed in Certificates
of Compliance should be highly relevant to other stakeholders as
existing model cases.
2. Reference Records
Reference

records

include

resources

and

information

[D.O.U.] de 21.5.2015 (Braz.), http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato20152018/2015/Lei/L13123.htm; Decreto No. 8.772, de 11 de Maio de 2016, D.O.U.
de 12.5.2016 (Braz.); SISGEN: SISTEMA NACIONAL DE GESTÃO DO PATRIMÔNIO
GENÉTICO E DO CONHECIMENTO TRADICIONAL ASSOCIADO [National System for
the Management of Genetic Heritage and Associated Traditional Knowledge],
https://sisgen.gov.br (Braz.).
86
See,
e.g.,
ABSCH,
Brazil–
Country
Profile,
https://absch.cbd.int/countries/BR (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
87
Id. art. 6, para. 3(e).
88
Id. art. 17, para. 3.
89
Id. art. 17, para 2; ABSCH, Internationally Recognized Certificates of
Compliance,
https://absch.cbd.int/search/nationalRecords?schema=absPermit
(listing over 140 Certificates of Compliance that have been issued based on twelve
provider countries so far, including Belarus, Bulgaria, Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, India, Kenya, Malta, Mexico, Panama, Peru, South Africa, and Spain,
among which India has processed the largest number of requests that have led to
eighty-six Certificates) (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
90
Nagoya Protocol art. 17, para. 4.
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immediately relevant to Access and Benefit-Sharing stakeholders.
They can be submitted by any registered user of the ABS ClearingHouse, including Parties, non-Parties, governments, international
organizations, indigenous and local communities, and other key
stakeholders. Types of records found under this section are: Virtual
Library Records; Capacity-building Initiatives; Model Contractual
Clauses, Codes of Conduct, Guidelines, Best Practices and/or
Standards; and Community protocols and procedures and customary
laws.91 Among these, model clauses, guidelines, best practices and
standards seem immediately helpful.92
3. Secretariat Managed Records
The CBD Secretariat (“SCBD”) regularly publishes official
information under this section, including meetings, news stories,
notifications, and formal statements. These are classified into:
What’s New; Notifications; Meetings; and News within this
section.93
III. ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING IN ACTION
A. Implementation and Enforcement
The new multilateral legal landscape that has loomed for the last
several years under the ABS framework is still in flux. As of 2018,
a majority of Parties have been actively working on establishing
national programs and building domestic capacity to become fully
compliant with the treaty provisions, but there is still considerable

91

ABSCH, Reference Records, https://absch.cbd.int (last visited Mar. 1,

2018).
92

ABSCH, Reference Records, Model Contractual Clauses, Codes of
Conduct,
Guidelines,
Best
Practices
and/or
Standards,
https://absch.cbd.int/search/referenceRecords?schema=modelContractualClause
(last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (listing twenty-eight publications including those from
industries, for example, the Biotechnology Innovation Organization in the U.S.
and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and
Associations based in Switzerland.).
93
ABSCH, SCBD Records, https://absch.cbd.int (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
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work to be done. 94 For example, as of April 2018, Competent
National Authorities have been designated and reported to the ABS
Clearing-House from fewer than half of the 105 Parties.95 Likewise,
legislative, administrative, and policy measures have been published
by only about half of the Parties.96 Moreover, these country-level
implementing measures have not been cross-checked, let alone
harmonized.
Legal unpredictability also remains high with respect to the
Protocol’s cross-jurisdictional enforcement mechanisms. As the
Protocol’s Article 18 stipulates, each Party is deemed to make
efforts to promote mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments and arbitral awards through international dispute
resolution mechanisms,97 which is in line with the comity of nations
doctrine. 98 The Protocol at least provides for access to justice by
means of an opportunity to seek recourse in cases of disputes arising
from MAT. 99 The treaty encourages MAT to include a dispute
94

See, e.g., Iden shigen no shutoku no kikai oyobi sono riyō kara shōzuru
rieki no kōsei katsu syōhei na haibun ni kansuru shishin [ABS shishin]
[Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization] (May 18, 2017),
http://www.env.go.jp/nature/biodic-abs/pdf_04/4-1.pdf (Japan). Japan has been a
signatory to the Protocol since May 2011, but it took the country six years to
become a Party by establishing ABS Guidelines—domestic implementing
measures—which came into force on August 20, 2017. See MINISTRY OF THE
ENV’T, GOV’T OF JAPAN, ABS GUIDELINES: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAGOYA
PROTOCOL IN JAPAN (July 2017), http://www.env.go.jp/nature/biodicabs/pdf/pamphlet_en.pdf.
95
ABSCH, https://absch.cbd.int/countries/status/party (displaying 45 out of
105 Parties in total as those having at least one Competent National Authority
designated, among which Mexico designates as many as six Competent National
Authorities) (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
96
Id. (displaying 45 out of 105 Parties as those having at least one legislative,
administrative, or policy measure published, among which India has as many as
thirty implementing measures published) (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
97
Nagoya Protocol art. 18, para. 3(b). See also id. art. 15, para. 3 & art. 16,
para. 3 (requiring that parties cooperate in cases of alleged violation of domestic
ABS legislation or regulatory requirements as far as possible and as appropriate).
98
See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 2071 (2015) (classifying recognition of foreign judgments as
“adjudicative comity” within the international comity doctrine.).
99
Nagoya Protocol art. 18, para. 2.
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settlement clause that prescribes the jurisdiction to which providers
and users will subject any matters of dispute, the applicable law, and
options for alternative dispute resolution. 100 On top of that, the
dispute settlement provision under the Convention also applies to
the Protocol, which provides that if negotiation or third-party
mediation does not resolve a dispute, parties must bring a case
before an international arbitral tribunal or the International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) as a means of dispute settlement. 101 However, an
individual or a private entity cannot be a party to ICJ proceedings,
nor are ICJ judgments automatically enforceable as domestic law in
national courts.102
Pursuant to Article 31 of the Protocol, the Conference of the
Parties is going to undertake an evaluation of the effectiveness of
the Protocol including both its implementation and enforcement
mechanisms for the first time on October 12, 2018, four years after
entering into force.103 This assessment must be a critical checkpoint
for assuring continued development of the Protocol as an effective
legal instrument to further its goal of equitable benefit sharing
between users and providers of genetic resources.
Moreover, for a number of years international organizations
such as WHO and WIPO, as well as the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) and other intergovernmental bodies with overlapping
global agendas, have recognized some gaps or incongruence in the
CBD and Nagoya Protocol with other legal instruments in several
key aspects. Nevertheless, the process of reconciliation has thus far
been slow.104
100
Id. arts. 6, para. 3(g)(i) & art. 18, para 1; see also WIPO, WIPO
Alternative
Dispute
Resolution
(ADR)
for
Biodiversity,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/specific-sectors/biodiversity/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018) (“Biodiversity disputes can concern a wide range of highly specific
subject matters relating . . . to patents, genetic resources, traditional knowledge,
plant varieties, environment, and food. They . . . can also involve sensitive nonlegal components of a commercial, cultural, ethical, or moral nature.”).
101
CBD art. 27, para. 3(b) & 5.
102
Statute of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] art. 34, ¶ 1, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (“Only states may be parties in cases before the
[ICJ].”); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 511 (2008).
103
Nagoya Protocol arts. 18, para. 4 & 31.
104
See supra notes 47, 55, 59, 61. See also, e.g., Matrix on Trade-Related
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Aside from large-scale initiatives leveraged at the governmental
and intergovernmental levels supporting this dynamic legal
ecosystem, the question of whether the Nagoya Protocol can
continue to operate effectively and sustainably in the future comes
down to individual users’ due diligence as primary contracting
parties of ABS agreements. In other words, the whole legal
ecosystem would hardly function without positive participation and
cooperation of individual users complying with established
procedures and MAT under the rule of law. Contract disputes will
inevitably arise from MAT. Because of the significantly contractual
basis of how the treaty is going to be implemented, as explained
above, appropriate conflict resolution rules must be established to
govern conflict of laws in cross-border contract disputes involving
genetic resources. International rules for construing bio-property
contracts under the Nagoya Protocol are urgently needed to improve
predictability of this instrument’s enforceability.
B. Implications for United States Stakeholders
The United States’ status as a non-Party to the Nagoya Protocol
notwithstanding, it is in the best interest of Americans to keep the
door open to opportunities for exploring untapped genetic resources
located outside the U.S boundaries, as firms and institutions benefit
from continued engagement in joint enterprises with global partners
from member states. These countries include economically
important jurisdictions like the European Union, Mexico, China,
India, and South Africa.105 In these scenarios, it would be unwise to
steer clear of international research and development opportunities
in fear of stepping into the unknown realm of the Nagoya Protocol.
However, once bound by the ABS scheme, it is difficult to imagine
that any government authority would grant special exceptions or
privileges to American users merely on the ground that the U.S. is a
Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Note by
the Secretariat (Revision), at 77, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.8 (Oct. 9,
2017) (providing a comprehensive list of topics previously addressed by the
Conference of the Parties to CBD relating to international trade and the work of
WTO, including the TRIPS Agreement).
105
See ABSCH, supra note 12.
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non-Party to the Protocol. As the Protocol Article 24 sets forth,
Parties must encourage non-Parties to adhere to the Protocol.106
More broadly, any attempt to import biological materials into
the United States without proper documentation, including a formal
permit issued by a provider country’s government, might invoke
U.S. domestic laws like the Lacey Act.107 The Lacey Act can hold a
party liable for transporting species taken illegally in violation of a
foreign law, although its enforceability in the ABS context is
unknown.108 Therefore, even on a voluntary basis, one should defer
to the international regulatory framework and abide by MAT as the
best course of action. This recommendation is valid even with the
U.S. government’s current status as a non-Party to the Convention—
an outlier in the United Nations community for unrelated political
or diplomatic reasons.
From a more practical standpoint, it would be prudent for U.S.
stakeholders, or potential users in any other jurisdictions that are
non-Parties, for that matter, to first identify and collaborate with
their foreign counterparts and legal counsel licensed in their
respective jurisdictions. Realistically, this would be the only way
American stakeholders can make an informed decision beyond just
obtaining baseline knowledge through the ABS Clearing-House,
because unlike the treaty member states, the U.S. federal
government currently lacks an office, website, and budget formally
dedicated to providing services on ABS-related matters for
American general public. 109 In contrast, stakeholders in member
states should have more direct access to relevant information
resources as well as the country’s administrative departments that
serve as National Focal Points or Checkpoints for their citizens.
106

Nagoya Protocol art. 24.
Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2012).
108
Id. § 3372 (making it unlawful for any person to import in foreign
commerce any fish, wildlife, or plant, whether live or dead, including parts taken,
possessed, transported, or sold in violation of foreign laws.).
109
But see CBD, United States of America – Country Profile,
https://www.cbd.int/countries/nfp/default.shtml?country=us
(listing
U.S.
Department of State and other federal government agencies’ representatives as
National Focal Points) (last visited Mar. 1, 2018); see also Digital Sequence
Information on Genetic Resources Public Meeting, 82 Fed. Reg. 28927 (June 26,
2017) (indicating the U.S. Department of State as the agency point of contact for
a CBD-related public hearing in the U.S.).
107
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They should be able to tell the current status of domestic
implementing measures and guide you through necessary
application procedures. Until the international standard and best
practices are sufficiently established, each provider country will
continue to be responsible for educating potential users of legal
procedures and paperwork required to meet specific ABS
requirements. The need for such foresight is obvious, given that
provider countries are the ones in the best position to expound their
own domestic statutes, rules, court decisions, and policies.
Meanwhile, relevant industries that are likely subject to the Nagoya
Protocol regulations in their primary activities should seriously
address the compliance issue in their risk assessment in relation to
international project management, technology transfer, and global
intellectual property rights management.
CONCLUSION
Once the Nagoya Protocol becomes fully operational as a
globally recognized system in the next few years, there should be
increased transparency, consistency, and accountability for
transactions of genetic resources among all players. Although the
United States is neither a signatory to the Convention on Biological
Diversity nor the Nagoya Protocol, American stakeholders are not
free to disregard these international rules. Because the principal
mechanism of implementing the Nagoya Protocol has a contractual
basis characterized by the Prior Informed Consent and Mutually
Agreed Terms, U.S. stakeholders who are going to enter into an
agreement under the Access and Benefit-Sharing scheme should
defer to this new international regulatory framework. Participants
should acknowledge the Mutually Agreed Terms incorporating
foreign domestic laws of a Party laid down to effectuate fair dealing
in biological materials across jurisdictions.
The long-term success of the Nagoya Protocol depends on
individual users’ due diligence and compliance with the new global
standard of utilizing genetic resources in a fair and equitable
manner. However, too much formality in procedures or
extraterritorial restrictive control by governments may function as a
strong disincentive to timely and efficient access to genetic
materials and may have a chilling effect on bona fide biodiversity
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research and bioprospecting activities that could lead to discoveries
of next-generation cancer therapies or biotechnological
breakthroughs. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of everyone
involved in bio-property transactions to comply with local rules
regardless of whether one’s home country is a signatory. While the
regulatory landscape is still in flux, an initial comprehensive review
of the Nagoya Protocol’s implementation status for the last four
years––due in late 2018––will be an important stepping stone to
envisioning the future development of this new ecosystem.
PRACTICE POINTERS
▪

Potential stakeholders planning to access genetic materials
are strongly encouraged to familiarize themselves with the
developing standards of the Nagoya Protocol through the
online Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House.

▪

As users of genetic resources, stakeholders are additionally
expected to work closely with their foreign counterpart
representing the country that is a Party to the Nagoya
Protocol, and to exercise due diligence in obtaining
information on domestic implementing measures of their
jurisdiction for full legal compliance.
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Figure 1. The Framework of the Nagoya Protocol.
Under the Nagoya Protocol’s Access and Benefit-Sharing (“ABS”) scheme,
acquiring genetic resources is subject to Prior Informed Consent (“PIC”) of the
provider country. Benefit-sharing will be executed according to Mutually Agreed
Terms (“MAT”). Each country designates National Focal Points, which provide
information on ABS to stakeholders and administer domestic regulations. An
Internationally Recognized Certificate of Compliance is issued by the Secretariat
based on national permits granted by the Competent National Authority of the
provider country and is published on the ABS Clearing-House. Designated
national Checkpoints collect relevant information, and monitor and report on the
utilization of genetic resources to support compliance and increase transparency.

